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THE WINDS OF CHANGE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN
NEW YORK 1941-1965
MONRAD G. PAULSEN*S INCE Chief Judge Desmond joined the Court of Appeals in January 1941,
there has been a legal revolution respecting the administration of criminal
justice. The criminal law cases decided by the Court of Appeals today shape
doctrines barely formulated as suggestions twenty-five years ago-doctrines
derived from the Constitution of New York and the Constitution of the
United States. Not only have constitutional provisions taken on a new im-
portance but the meaning assigned to these formulations has been transformed.
The Supreme Court of the United States has applied most of the Bill of Rights
to the states, and the requirements of the Bill of Rights have been expanded
beyond the expectations of anyone working in 1941.
Looking at the criminal law cases which came before the Court of Appeals
during Chief Judge Desmond's first year and a half on the Court, we do not
find defendants who raise issues of illegal searches and seizures because
New York had not embraced the exclusionary evidence principle. Indeed,
it was Judge Benjamin Cardozo of the Court of Appeals who (fifteen years
before) had written the classic sentences quoted over and over again in opposi-
tion to the adoption of the exclusionary rule. "The criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered .... The pettiest peace officer would have
it in his power through overzeal or indiscretion to confer immunity upon
an offender for crimes the most flagitious."1 The cases in 1941-1942 did not
discuss the question whether the police may question persons under indictment
without the presence of counsel nor whether questioning may continue after
a suspect has asked to see his lawyer. In those first years of Judge Desmond's
service, defendants on appeal argued about the sufficiency of evidence; over
whether the testimony of a complaining witness in a rape case or a case of
compulsory prostitution had been sufficiently corroborated to justify a
conviction; whether a dying declaration had been properly admitted into evi-
dence. The admissibility of confessions was generally controlled by the terms
of a legislative enactment, section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In some ways People v. Buckalter2 provides an example of the mine run
of criminal cases then coming before the Court of Appeals. Buchalter involved
the gang murder of a candy store owner who might have given information
to District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey, then investigating the protection
racket and extortion. The trial was filled with errors. The judge had not re-
mained an impartial, detached arbiter. His statements obliquely referring to
the defendant's failure to testify would almost certainly be grounds for reversal
* Professor of Law, School of Law, Columbia University.
1. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23, 150 N.E. 585, 587, 588 (1926).
2. 289 N.Y. 181, 45 N.E.2d 225 (1942).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
in 1966. The prosecutor's summation was objectionable from many points of
view. Nevertheless, four judges of the Court of Appeals voted to sustain the
conviction below, while three judges, including Judge Desmond, joined in
dissent, vigorously attacking the fairness of the trial. Chief Judge Lehman,
writing a concurring opinion, agreed that errors in the record "cannot be dis-
regarded without hesitation lest in our anxiety that the guilty should not es-
cape ... we affirm a judgment tainted with errors and obtained through viola-
tions of fundamental rights."3 The trial judge had made serious mistakes in
ruling on evidence and had "usurped the function of the jury." Nevertheless,
Chief Judge Lehman voted to uphold the conviction because he had "no doubt"
that the errors had not affected the jury's verdict.
In 1965 the doctrine of harmless error does not readily provide a principle
by which to sustain convictions obtained in proceedings which violate con-
stitutional rights.
I. POLICE INTERROGATION OF A PERSON IN CUSTODY
During the past twenty-five years, because of developing doctrines in
the Supreme Court of the United States and because of the New York Court's
own definition of constitutional principles, the Court of Appeals has sharply
curtailed the right of the police to question suspects in custody. Three sets
of rules have combined to produce the limitation.
First, many police interrogation tactics have been outlawed through an
expanded conception of the general prohibition against the use of "coerced"
confessions. Twenty-five years ago a confession in the State of New York was
admissible "unless made under the influence of fear produced by threats, or
unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney that he shall not be
prosecuted therefor. . .. -4 The gloss on the fourteenth amendment supplied
by the United State Supreme Court's confession cases was not then extensive.
The statutory test, wrote Judge Burke in People v. Spano5 was whether the
confession "was voluntarily made in the traditional and ordinary sense, i£e.,
without duress, mental or physical." The voluntariness of the confession in
New York was a matter to be decided by a jury upon proper instructions.
Approved instructions told the jury to disregard the confession if they found
it to be the product of duress and to use it in their deliberations only if they
found it to be voluntary. That the accused person who confessed had been ques-
tioned for a long time by relays of officers while he was in custody, or that the
New York statute requiring prompt arraignment had been violated were simply
items to be taken into account by the jurymen as they assessed the issue of
duress.
In People v. Malinski6 the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of the
3. Id. at 225, 45 N.E.2d at 248.
4. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395.
5. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958).
6. 292 N.Y. 360, 55 N.E.2d 353 (1944).
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defendant even though the jury had heard evidence of a confession which had
been preceded by relatively oppressive conduct by the police. The defendant,
Malinski, had been questioned vigorously over a considerable period of time,
bad not been brought before a magistrate promptly for an arraignment, and had
spent part of the time in a police station without clothing, wrapped only in a
blanket. The majority of the Court of Appeals (including Judge Desmond)
did not perceive that it was their task to characterize the behavior of the
police as coercive or as merely illustrative of good, vigorous police work.
Whether the confession therefore was induced by fear produced by
threats and violence was for the jury to determine. They weighed his
testimony as to the violence and they considered the fact that he was
compelled to spend most of one day clothed in his underwear and a
blanket and the excuse of the police that that was a way to prevent
escape in the hotel. Whether these latter circumstances would produce
fear so that a man would confess -his crime would depend a great
deal upon the type of man involved. We do not think it can be held as
a matter of law that it brought about such fear that the confession
followed. All those questions it seems to us were for the jury which
saw Malinski and heard him. They were in a position to judge from
his appearance and attitude what effect depriving him of his outer
clothing would have upon him.7
The Malinski decision was overturned by the Supreme Court of the United
States.8 The action of the Court was the first reversal of a state conviction
based on a "coerced confession" taken by a police department in the urban
North. The majority opinion in the Supreme Court pointed to several factors.
Malinski had been held incommunicado and had been denied access to a
lawyer in spite of his request. The majority put emphasis on the fact that
he had been stripped of most of his clothing in order to humiliate him and
to encourage him to believe that he might be beaten. These factors, none
involving a physical blow, created pressure enough for the Court to characterize
the "confession ... [as] the product of fear-one on which we could not permit
a person to stand convicted for a crime."9
During the 1940's and 1950's the Court of Appeals was generally willing
to leave a jury's finding undisturbed on the issue of coercion, unless prodded
by the Supreme Court of the United States, even though the defendant had
been the subject of extensive and tough questioning. A new note was sounded
in People v. Leyra.10 In that case the police had introduced the defendant, sus-
pected of murder, to a physician specializing in psychiatry. The flavor of
the tape recorded conversation between the physician and the defendant is
reflected in a portion of Judge Froessel's opinion. The psychiatrist, "calling
himself defendant's doctor, playing upon the latter's natural fears and hopes,
7. Id. at 372-73, 55 N.E.2d at 358.
8. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
9. Id. at 407.
10. 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951).
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pressing his hands upon defendant's head with accompanying commands,
and suggesting details to an unwilling mind by persistent and unceasing
questioning; informing defendant that he was not morally responsible; making
deceptive offers of friendship and numerous promises, express and implied;
giving assurances in a pseudo-confidential atmosphere of physician and pa-
tient . . . ."I used his professional standing and skill to elicit incriminatory
statements.
This interview was held to 'be a form of mental coercion. The Court of
Appeals was disturbed about the perversion of the physician-patient relation-
ship. "If a physician may be thus used, then why not a lawyer or a clergyman?
The essential fairness which is supposed to form the warp and woof of our
fabric of justice would certainly be wanting if practices such as these were to
be approved ... ."' The violation of due process was so clearly established
that the judges reversed the lower court even though the confession had been
put to a jury under appropriate instructions respecting coercion.
The Leyra opinion contained language which might have formed the basis
for decisions excluding confessions which were the product of extensive police
interrogation.
Torture of the mind is just as contrary to inherent fairness and
basic justice as torture of the body. A confession by which a person
forfeits his life must be grounded on reasoned and voluntary choice.
We would have to close our minds to the plain import of what occurred
to deny that here was a deliberate attempt to extract a confession
through the ceaseless pressure of a skillful psychiatrist by his peculiar
technique, claiming to be defendant's doctor, promising to help him,
giving assurances and at the same time conducting an unrelenting
interrogation of the exhausted accused. 13
It would not have been difficult, for example, to classify the treatment given
Malinski as "torture of the mind" giving rise to a confession which was
not "grounded on reasoned and voluntary choice." But Leyra did not prove
to be a seminal opinion. The following year the Court of Appeals affirmed a
conviction in People v. Steih' 4 based upon a confession taken after twelve
hours of intermittent questioning, stretched out over a thirty-two hour period,
a period after arrest and prior to the defendant's appearance before a judge.
During the entire time no warning was given the defendant respecting his
right to silence nor his right to counsel.
In the Supreme Court of the United States, Stein'5 was affirmed. Mr.
Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, set limits to the apparently expand-
ing reach of federal control over police interrogation. "But we have never
gone so far as to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a one-to-one
11. Id. at 362, 98 NYE.2d at 558.
12. Id. at 363, 98 N.E.2d at 559.
13. Id. at 364-65, 98 NYE.2d at 559.
14. 303 N.Y. 856, 104 N.E.2d 917 (1952).
15. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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ratio between interrogators and prisoners, or that extensive questioning of a
prisoner automatically makes the evidence he gives in response constitutionally
prohibited." 16 The reason for excluding physically coerced confessions was
the danger of a false confession.
The tendency of the innocent, as well as the guilty, to risk remote
results of a -false confession rather than suffer immediate pain is so
strong that judges long ago found it necessary to guard against mis-
carriages of justice by treating any confession made concurrently
with torture or threat of brutality as too untrustworthy to be received
as evidence of guilt.17
Mr. Justice Jackson spoke of the usefulness of questioning:
Interrogation is not inherently coercive, as is physical violence. Inter-
rogation does have social value in solving crime, as physical force does
not. By their own answers many suspects clear themselves, and the
information they give frequently points out another who is guilty.
Indeed, interrogation of those who know something about the facts is
the chief means to solution of crime.'8
The Jackson opinion, one of the most satisfactory ever handed down by
the Supreme Court in the eyes of law enforcement officials, has not survived
as an authoritative statement of the High Court's attitude in respect to con-
fessions. Today the truth or falsehood of a confession is an "irrelevant and im-
permissible" consideration relative to the issue of voluntariness.' 9 Confessions
by suspects who have been isolated from lawyers and friends for relatively
brief periods have been held inadmissible on constitutional grounds.20 We have
learned since Stein that the true basis for excluding a "coerced" confession is
not the danger of a false confession but the need to protect the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination. 21 For example, in Rogers v. Riclmond,22
a 1961 case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Supreme Court of the
United States that the test of a coerced confession was "[W]hether the behav-
ior of the State's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear petitioner's
will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined ....
To put the matter another way, the inadmissibility of coerced confessions was
rooted in the nature of the American system of criminal law. Involuntary con-
fessions are excluded
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the
methods used ...offend an underlying principle in the enforcement
of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisi-
torial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt by
16. Id. at 185.
17. Id. at 182.
18. Id. at 184.
19. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964).
20. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
21. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
22. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
23. Id. at 544.
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evidence independently and freely secured and may not by [its own]
coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.
24
Restrictions on interrogation have come not only from the rule forbidding
the use of coerced confessions, but also from two other constitutionally estab-
lished principles: the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination.
People v. Spano25 is the beginning point of a new departure in the New
York law. Spano had been indicted before he surrendered to the police. Taken
into custody pursuant to a bench warrant issued upon the indictment, he
was questioned thereafter in the absence of counsel and subsequently confessed.
While a majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed Spano's conviction, three
dissenters, Judges Desmond, Fuld, and Van Voorhis joined in an opinion
which ultimately was to prevail. The dissenters would not accept a confession
given in the absence of counsel, "when the time for investigation has passed."
The proper pattern of criminal procedure in the United States did not permit it.
Judge Desmond wrote:
A citizen, learning that he has 'been indicted and that a bench warrant
is outstanding against him, consults an attorney. The attorney, con-
forming strictly to his professional duty, instructs his client forthwith
to surrender, arranges for surrender to the representatives of the Dis-
trict Attorney's office at a police station. The lawyer accompanies his
client to the place of surrender, warns him not to make any statement,
then leaves his client in the custody of the officers, justifiably con-
fident that the client's rights are safely under the protection of the
court and of its mandate ....
The bench warrant, pursuant to section 301 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, directed the peace officers to arrest defendant "and
bring him 'before the court to answer the indictment." No policeman
or prosecutor had any right to change or disregard that direction. De-
fendant was in the custody of the court for the sole purpose of pleading
to the indictment and awaiting trial in due course. All this was delib-
erately ignored by the police and prosecutor.26
Spano had a lawyer. Indeed, he had surrendered to a member of the
prosecutor's office accompanied by his lawyer. "A more grievous and offensive
disregard of a court's mandates and a citizen's rights can hardly be imagined."
Judge Desmond recognized the two constitutional principles to which we have
referred above: "[T]he right to have the advice of a lawyer at every stage of
a court proceeding, and the right not to be forced to testify against oneself
during such a proceeding.127 A magistrate or a coroner or any judicial officer
may not compel an accused to make admissions of his guilt, therefore, he may
not "be subjected to secret midnight questioning out of reach of any lawyer,
till he confesses."2 8
24. Id. at 540-41.
25. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958).
26. Id. at 265, 150 N.E.2d at 231, 173 N.Y.S.2d 800.
27. Id. at 266, 150 N.E.2d at 231, 173 N.Y.S.2d 801.
28. Id. at 266, 150 N2E.2d at 232, 173 N.Y.S.2d 801.
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Spano was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States,29 a majority
holding that the confession had been obtained by a violation of the fourteenth
amendment's prohibition against the use of coerced confessions. The majority
was moved by a point which had not made an impact on the majority of the
Court of Appeals. "[T]he use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone
on their inherent untrustworthiness.1 30 In this case the defendant's "will" had
been overborn by "official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused."
The questioning had been conducted during the night and far into the hours
of the early morning. The police had employed as one of the battery of interroga-
tors a childhood friend of Spano. The officers possessed the "undeviating intent"
to extract a confession and hence the confession "must be examined with the
most careful scrutiny." Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan and Stewart con-
curred on the grounds that Spano had been "denied effective representation by
counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him."
Later the Court of Appeals adopted the view of the concurring Justices in
Spano v. New York. Chief Judge Desmond's majority opinion in People v.
DiBiasi3l is of course inconsistent with the majority of the Court of Appeals in
People v. Spano. The Chief Judge believed that a reading of the majority opinion
in the Supreme Court's Spano v. New York as well as the force of the concur-
ring opinions provided reasons for abandoning the Court of Appeals earlier
position. "In view of what happened in the Supreme Court we do not think we
are concluded by this court's decision in Spano."3 Yet reason alone had not
moved the Court of Appeals. The personnel of the Court had changed between
the Spano decision of May 1958, and the DiBiasi opinion of April 1960. Chief
Judge Conway had retired and Judge Sydney Foster had taken a place on
New York's highest court.
In People v. Waterman,33 the Court of Appeals broadened the protection
of an accused against deprivation of right to counsel. In Waterman, a statement,
received in evidence, had been made to a police officer during the period be-
tween the return of the indictment and the arraignment. The indictment had
been voted in February, 1959, against the fictitious defendant, "John Doe." The
majority of the Court could see no difference between an indictment naming
the defendant and one in which his name was later substituted. The question-
ing took place after the indictment upon which he would be tried and post-
indictment interrogation is proper only after counsel has 'been made available.
Judge Fuld's opinion argued that a "congruence" must be maintained "through-
out the course of a formally instituted criminal action" between the judicial
processes of post-arrest screening, and trial, and the non-judicial investigatory
process prior to trial.
29. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
30. Id. at 320.
31. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
32. Id. at 550, 166 N.E.2d at 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d 25.
33. 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
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These New York cases were pushed a step further in People v. Meyer34
where the Court of Appeals ruled inadmissible a statement obtained from an
accused after he had been arraigned according to sections 165-88 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, and bound over for action by the grand jury.
In reason and logic the admissibility into evidence of a post-arraign-
ment statement should not be treated any differently than a post-
indictment statement. A statement so taken necessarily impinges on
the fundamentals of protection against testimonial compulsion, since
the jury might well accord it weight beyond its worth to reach a verdict
of guilty.s5
In sum, it is the New York law that a statement or confession taken from
an accused after the formal opening of a criminal case against him (whether
by indictment, information or a judicial decision holding him for Grand Jury
action) may not be used against him unless the accused knows of his right to
remain silent, his right to consult counsel and has effectively waived them. The
opportunity for secret but legally permissible interrogation of a person formally
accused has been brought to an end.
These developments, it should be pointed out, have been mirrored on the
Federal level in Massiak v. United States. 36 In Massiah, a defendant freed on
bail made incriminatory statements to a confederate who, without the knowl-
edge of the defendant, carried electronic broadcasting equipment which trans-
mitted to a tape recorder. The Supreme Court, using reasoning similar to that
employed by the Court of Appeals in the cases discussed above, held the state-
ments to be inadmissible. They had been taken in violation of the right to
counsel.
Another source of new restrictions on police questioning flows from a dif-
ferent aspect of the right to counsel. In People v. Donovan," the Court of
Appeals ruled that a confession may not be used if it is obtained during a
period of detention after an attorney has requested and been denied access
to the person in custody. The ruling was based partly on the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and partly upon New York's statutory and con-
stitutional provisions respecting the privilege against self incrimination and
the right to counsel. Judge Stanley Fuld wrote, "[O]ne of the more important
protections which counsel can confer while his client is being detained by the
authorities is to preserve his client's privilege against self incrimination .... ,8
Judge Fuld was impressed with the incongruity of permitting the District At-
torney to extract a confession from the lips of the accused while the accused's
lawyer was unable to see him. The requirements of "fairness in the conduct of
34. 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962).
35. Id. at 164, 182 N.E.2d at 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
36. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
37. 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
38. Id. at 151, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
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criminal causes" justify any diminution which may result in the efficiency of
police interrogation designed to solve difficult cases.8 9
The Donovan doctrine was applied in People v. Gunner" to a situation in
which a lawyer "merely informed the police of his retention and of his desire
that no statements be taken." He did not request to see his client; indeed, a
visit would have been impossible because the suspect was not in the hands of
the local Nassau County police, but was being interrogated by Los Angeles
police at the request of New York officials.
Gunner is especially interesting because the opinion refused to follow a
liberal reading of certain federal authority.
Relying on People v. Dorado (394 F.2d 952, ...62 Cal. 2d -, 62
A.C. 350) and certain language in Escobedo v. Illinois... the defen-
dant contends that the statements obtained by the police, in the
absence of counsel, after his arrest should be held inadmissible, even
though he never requested a lawyer and none appeared in his behalf
at the time, since he was then the "prime suspect" and the object of
interrogating him was not to solve a crime but to elicit a confession.
At such point, the defendant argues, he became entitled to the aid of
counsel (if he so desired) and, accordingly, it was incumbent upon the
police to advise him of his right to refrain from answering any ques-
tions and also of his right to a lawyer.
The court finds this argument without merit; the majority is of
the opinion that the rule heretofore announced in our decisions (see,
e.g., People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, supra; People v. Donovan, 13
N.Y.2d 148, supra; People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162; People v. Noble,
9 N.Y.2d 571; People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561; People v. DiBiasi,
7 N.Y.2d 544) should not be extended to render inadmissible incul-
patory statements obtained by law enforcement officers from a person
who, taken into custody for questioning prior to his arraignment or
indictment, is not made aware of his privilege to remain silent and of
his right to a lawyer even where it appears that such person has become
the target of the investigation and stands in the shoes of an accused.4 '
Judge Fuld's opinion in Gunner indicates that he and Chief Judge Des-
mond would have followed Dorado and the "certain language in Escobedo,"
which would have excluded statements made by the defendant (Gunner was
certainly the "target of the investigation") after his arrest and before his
lawyer talked to the police.
Surely Judge Fuld and Chief Judge Desmond are correct. Donovan, Failla,
and Gunner give protection to the suspect who already -has a lawyer. The doc-
trine fails to limit the interrogation of those who have no lawyer or fail to
make a request to consult with counsel. It puts the man of means and the ex-
39. People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 199 N.E.2d 366, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964) extended
Donovan to a situation in which the confession was recorded, in part, before the time the
defendant's lawyer had made contact with the police. To fragment the confession would
only lead to confusion and "uncertainty in the admissibility of evidence." The suggestion
to do so was "wholly impracticable."
40. 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965).
41. Id. at 232-33, 205 N.E.2d at 855, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29. (Emphasis added.)
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perienced criminal with access to legal assistance in a much better position than
the poor and the inexperienced. It may be that we ought not to model out a
system of criminal justice on the privileges of the wealthy or on the advantages
enjoyed by the professional criminal. Yet we are not long likely to tolerate a
system which gives advantages to those least in need of protection and which
fails to extend protection to the most vulnerable. The egalitarian forces, so
powerful in the politics and moral standards of the 1960's, are likely to insist
either that Donovan and its progeny be abandoned or that the reach of the
case be extended by requiring a warning about the right to silence before in-
terrogation and a caution that counsel is available before the questioning pro-
ceeds further. Furthermore, counsel must be made available to those without
funds. There may indeed even be a constitutional basis for expanding Donovan
in this way. Griffin v. Illinois42 forbids that the criminal law create "invidious
discriminations" based upon wealth. Donovan and Gunner arguably create
such a discrimination.
II. THE PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING CONrESSIONS
Not only has the substance of the rule about coerced confessions changed
since 1941, but federal law has forced a change in the local procedure used to
test voluntariness. Stein v. New York 43 not only affirmed the use of a confession,
but also upheld the constitutionality of the New York procedure which put
the question of coercion to a jury under the instruction that if the confession
was judged to be involuntary the jurors should disregard it, but if it was
found to be voluntary and uncoerced, they might use it. Sustaining the New
York procedure for the handling of confessions created a dilemma for the
Supreme Court. According to the Malinski opinion, if a coerced confession has
been presented to a jury, the jury's verdict of guilty must be overturned even
though other evidence clearly established guilt. Under the New York procedure,
a jury would obviously know of a confession which the jury later might decide
to be involuntary. Furthermore, under the New York procedure, appellate review
of the issue of voluntariness was well nigh impossible because a jury, bringing
in a general verdict, did not inform the court how it has disposed of the con-
fession. In 1964 this branch of Stein was expressly overruled for these reasons
in a Supreme Court case coming from New York, Jackson v. Denno.4 4
Jackson v. Denno required that New York provide a procedure whereby
it would be clear what the fact-finders were deciding in fact when trying an
allegedly involuntary confession. The Court of Appeals made its response in
People v. Huntley.45 Chief Judge Desmond, writing the opinion, addressed two
problems: (a) how shall the issue of voluntariness be decided in the future,
42. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
43. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
44. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
45. 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
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(b) what sort of remedy is appropriate for those presently imprisoned whose
convictions had been based on confessions put to a jury.
To take the second point first, it should be remembered that the ordinary
coram nobis proceeding would not, on the face of things, be available to give
a remedy -because the issue of coercion had been presented by the trial record
and hence could have been raised on appeal. In theory, the point decided by
Jackson v. Denno could have been put in 1940 or 1950. But Stein's lawyers
had tried it and lost. The trouble for Stein (and for Huntley) was that he
could have successfully challenged the New York procedure only in the 1960's.
Huntley's delay in pressing his point was not due to indolence or "dog in the
manger" tactics. Huntley had to wait until the law had changed.
People v. Huntley broadened the scope of coram nobis and for good reasons.
Jackson v. Denno itself involved a prisoner who had been convicted many years
before. The Supreme Court "necessarily meant . . . that its new requirement
of a separate hearing as to voluntariness of confessions applied as well to
criminal judgments which were no longer in the 'normal appellate process.' -46
Prisoners should make a "coram nobis type motion" to the trial court where-
upon they might have a hearing before the judge on the issue of voluntariness.
For the future, People v. Huntley adopted the so-called Massachusetts
procedure said in Jackson v. Denno to be one of those constitutionally appro-
priate. Under this procedure a trial judge must find a voluntariness beyond a
reasonable doubt. The prosecution must give notice that he intends to offer a
confession and after such notice is given, the defense must notify the prosecutor
of the desire for the pre-trial hearing.
Two judges, Van Voorhis and Scileppi objected to the broadening of coram
nobis. Judge Van Voorhis, the author of the dissenting opinion, was concerned
about the uncertainties introduced into the criminal process by principles that
undercut the finality of criminal judgments. He did not feel impelled by force
of federal law to broaden the coram nobis writ. If the federal courts wish to
grant relief under the federal constitution they "may issue their process as they
have done in the past. . . ." "We are," he wrote, "not legally or morally obli-
gated to assume this responsibility for jail deliveries, nor will doing so, in my
opinion, accomplish either law or justice."47
Under the Massachusetts rule for testing the voluntariness of confessions,
the judge, after he has made his determination on the issue of voluntariness,
submits the question to the jury as well. In short, the Massachusetts pro-
cedure gives the defendant two chances to demonstrate that a confession has
been taken in violation of constitutional standards. Two times at bat seems
better than one, but perhaps the baseball analogy is faulty. If two agencies
have the responsibility of making a distressing, but vital decision, neither agency
may face up to the full measure of the task. The first to decide may assume
46. Id. at 75, 204 N.E.2d at 182, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
47. Id. at 81, 82, 204 N.E.2d at 185, 186, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 846, 847.
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that tough cases will be properly disposed of by the second and the second may
assume in difficult situations that they might well be guided by the first. Judge
Van Voorhis in his dissenting opinion (though not dissenting on this point)
reflects the problem when he says that New York's choice of the Massachusetts
rule may not, when all the evidence is in, work a very great change in the prior
New York procedure.
[T] he average Trial Judge, if he knows that the matter will be decided
finally by the jury anyhow, is likely to find that it was voluntary as a
fact by applying similar standards of judgment to those which he
would have used under the old law in determining whether or not it
would be against the weight of the evidence to decide that it was
voluntary. The difference, in common practice, is likely to be more
verbal than real.48
In New York a plea of guilty operates to waive any questions of whether
a confession was illegally obtained.49 On the surface the rule seems inconsistent
with a case such as People v. Rodriguez5" in which a confession was ruled inad-
missible because it was adduced by confronting a suspected person with illegally
obtained evidence. The confession thus produced was said to be the "fruit of
the poisonous tree." Is not a plea of guilty also the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
when its entry rests upon the fact that the defendant confessed after being sub-
jected to unlawful pressure? It is difficult to see how an inquiry into the issue
of coercion is properly blocked by offering a plea of guilty which itself was
produced by the very illegality which inquiry might establish.
A very recent case has put the question sharply. In People v. DeFlumer,6'
a prisoner, employing a motion in the nature of a writ coram nobis, sought to
prove that his 1947 plea of guilty, entered when he was fifteen years old, had
been taken improperly. He argued that his confession, made before the plea of
guilty, had been unconstitutionally obtained. The child (before reaching his
fifteenth birthday) was interrogated for several hours without the presence of
counsel and without the supporting advice of his parents. In fact the parents
were not permitted to visit their child in the custody of the police for at least
two and one-half days after his arrest. Without much doubt the confession was
taken in violation of constitutional standards as they are understood today. In
DeFlumer the defense counsel advised a plea of guilty because he believed
that the confession could lawfully be admitted in the trial against the defen-
dant. He was convinced that the Court of Appeals of that day would have
treated the confessions of children and adults in exactly the same way. By
advising the guilty plea the defense lawyer made certain that his youthful client
did not face the death penalty. It is hard to see, in these circumstances, how
48. Id. at 85, 204 N.E.2d at 187-88, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
49. People v. Nicholson, 11 N.Y.2d 1067, 184 N.E.2d 190, 230 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1962);
People v. Griffin, 16 N.Y.2d 508, 208 N.E.2d 179, 260 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1965).
50. 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962).
51. 16 N.Y.2d 20, 209 N.E.2d 93, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1965).
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a guilty plea should block the assessment of the underlying confession in col-
lateral proceedings.
III. POST-CoNviCTIoN REMEDIES iN NE W Yoiu
We have seen, from People v. Huntley, the new rule requiring that a judge
decide on the question of voluntariness in a confessions case is to be applied,
retrospectively, to convicts who could no longer appeal because of the lapse
of time. This fact raises all of the questions surrounding New York's post-
conviction remedies, remedies made important in the past twenty-five years.
These remedies, available after the time for appeal has expired, are most im-
portant because they are a defendant's last chance. Curiously enough, these
remedies are available to correct procedural errors but not to overturn a con-
viction of someone who can demonstrate his innocence.
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have made it clear that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires a state to provide
some sort of post-conviction "corrective process"52 to redress error of federal
constitutional law. If there is no available state remedy, the prisoner's recourse
is to apply for a writ of habeas corpus in the proper federal district court.58
In New York the post-conviction remedy most commonly available to an
accused is a motion to set aside the conviction (commonly called a writ coram
nobis) made in the court which entered the original judgment.54 As we shall
see, habeas corpus also plays a role, but in a very restricted area. The motion
to set aside has much in common with the common law writ of coram nobis, a
writ used at common law to correct certain errors of fact which could not be
the basis of an appeal because they were outside the record. The judgment
would be set aside if the facts were unknown at the time of the trial and if, had
they been known, the judgment would not have been rendered.55
The New York version of coram nobis was born in Lyons v. Goldstein.56
In Lyons, a defendant who had pleaded guilty to a felony (in 1936) in the Court
of General Sessions for New York County petitioned that court to open the
judgment on the ground that the plea had been obtained by fraud. Upon appli-
cation of the Commissioner of Correction of New York, the Supreme Court
issued an order of prohibition against the judge of General Sessions before whom
the motion was pending. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's
order. The Court of Appeals reversed. "The inherent power of a court to set
aside its judgment which was procured by fraud and misrepresentation cannot
be doubted .... -57 A little later in the same opinion "coercion" is added to the
52. See Gallegoes v. State, 370 U.S. 49 (1963).
53. See Rutledge, J. concurring in Mareno v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563 (1947). This
portion of the article has been drawn from a study made previously for the New York
Law Revision Commission.
54. See Fuld, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 117 N.Y.L.J. p. 2212 col. 1, p. 2230
col. 1, p. 2248 cols. 1, 2 (June 5, 6, 7 1947).
55. Frank, Coram Nobis (1953) Pars. 1.01-1.04.
56. 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943).
57. Id. at 25, 47 NXE.2d at 428.
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list of reasons which might cause a court to set aside its judgment. It should
be underscored that the power to set aside the judgment was not expressly con-
ferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Court of Appeals opinion pointed out that only through the recogni-
tion of "inherent" power to correct errors based on fraud, coercion and mis-
representation, would an adequate remedy be provided. The Court dismissed
executive clemency as inadequate to protect the accused and further suggested
that to deny an accused opportunity to be heard on the question whether he
had been induced to plead guilty by fraud or coercion would be to impair a
constitutional right.
Morhous v. N.Y. Supreme Court58 made it clear that the primary remedy
by which a convicted person might set aside an illegal conviction is the pro-
ceeding approved in Lyons v. Goldstein. Morhous held that the Supreme Court
of New York had no power to determine, on a writ of habeas corpus, whether
the relator had been deprived of his liberty without due process of law (at least
for cases in which coram nobis could be applied). Habeas corpus, the Court
said, would lie only if the convicting court lacked jurisdiction over the accused
or of the offense with which he was charged. The court further indicated that
habeas corpus might be available if the convict had no other remedy by which
to raise a constitutional question. However, since Lyons an appropriate remedy
was, in fact, within the petitioner's reach on the facts of Morhous (conviction
allegedly obtained by knowing use of perjured testimony).
After Morhous, habeas corpus was not to play an important role in the
correction of serious procedural errors. In some sense even the most arbitrary
tribunal may have jurisdiction of the accused and the offense. New York has
not extended the office of habeas corpus on the federal pattern, by using the
notion that a tribunal failing to afford the fundamentals of a fair trial is without
jurisdiction.
On July 3, 1957, the Court of Appeals decided a series of three cases which
raised important questions concerning the reasons for granting or refusing a
motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis. In the most important case,
People v. Sullivan,5 9 the petitioner, convicted on a plea of guilty of the crime
of robbery in the first degree, sought to vacate his conviction on the ground
that the sentence was imposed without complying with the statutory require-
ments contained in section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Section 480
provides that the clerk of the court must ask the accused whether he has any
legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him.) The
petitioner had been represented by counsel at the time of the guilty plea. The
Court of Appeals unanimously agreed that the writ would not lie. However,
Judge Desmond, in a short concurring statement, pointed to a need for clarifi-
cation concerning the matters which can be raised by coram nobis. "I concur
58. 293 N.Y. 131, 56 N.E.2d 79 (1944).
59. 3 N.Y.2d 196, 144 N.E.2d 6, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1957).
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in the result only. Because of the distinctions heretofore made and now being
made as to the various post-judgment remedies in criminal causes, no clear
rule or rules exist and each case must be decided according to its own equities." 60
The opinion of the Court does leave room for clarification. At one point
it is said that the petitioner's claim had been reviewable on appeal and therefore,
he "may not be permitted to forego his right of appeal from the judgment and
resort to the remedy of coram nobis .... ,61 Most naturally such a statement
means that if, given adequate counsel, an error could have been corrected on
appeal, then no later corrective process is available. Yet an expression later in
the opinion can be read as suggesting that some other remedy might be available.
"Where the alleged basic legal error is evident and does not affect the validity
of the judgment . . ., but only the validity of the sentence, the defendant is
limited to the post-conviction remedies of appeal, motion in arrest of judgment,
motion to withdraw plea or habeas corpus, according to the specific error
raised. ... ,"0 This statement can be construed to suggest that the present
petitioner, sentenced in 1935, might (in 1957) have a remedy through habeas
corpus to raise a question as to the validity of the sentence and, there-
fore, coram nobis is not available. In that view the petitioner merely chose the
wrong remedy in the Sullivan case. Further toward the end of the opinion, it is
said, "Where, as here, . .. [the complaint] is not one of fact constituting a
violation of due process . . . or a denial of right to counsel .. .but one of law
apparent on the record, coram nobis may not be utilized as an alternative
remedy to appeal, motion in arrest of judgment, motion to withdraw plea, or
habeas corpus .... -63 Here, the specific kind of infirmity which vitiates the
conviction (a question of law apparent on the record rather than due process
or the right to counsel) is given as the reason why coram nobis is not appropriate.
Judge Fuld, concurring in Sullivan, pointed out that, while, in general,
coram nobis had been employed to call up facts unknown at the time of the
judgment, some exceptions had been made. He would not make further excep-
tion, but would use coram nobis only when no other remedy is available. "In
the present case, other courses to remedy the asserted error were open to
Sullivan and, accordingly, coram nobis may not be utilized."
64
Any reading of Sullivan which would conclude that a present remedy other
than coram nobis was available to petitioner is unfortunate. We ought not to
have a system of different procedures to raise questions after the time for the
normal post-conviction maneuvers has expired. The refusal to vacate the judg-
ment of conviction in Sullivan should not be based on the ground that the
wrong remedy had been chosen, but rather on the ground that under the facts
of the case no remedy ought to be given. Nor is it sound to turn -the granting of
60. Id. at 199, 144 N.E.2d at 9, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
61. Id. at 198, 144 N.E.2d at 8, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
62. Id. at 198, 144 N.E.2d at 8, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
63. Id. at 199, 144 N.E.2d at 9, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
64. Id. at 200, 144 N.2d at 9, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
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the remedy on whether the error was a fact outside the record or of law apparent
in the record, unless this formal test reflects a defensible criterion.
One of the July 3, 1957 opinions, People v. Silverman,0 5 involved a defen-
dant who alleged that the trial judge had peremptorily assigned counsel over
defendant's objections and had not permitted time to get counsel of his own
choosing. The state urged that petitioner had accepted the benefit of the
assigned counsel at the trial and on the appeal. The original appeal was not
placed on the denial of counsel ground. A hearing to determine the truth of
the allegations was granted by the Court of Appeals because the assigned
counsel might have been "reluctant to challenge the propriety of their assign-
ment . . . .Such an inhibition might impair the right of defendant to coun-
sel .... ,,66 Such language stresses the factor of the practical inability of the
petitioner to raise the present question at an earlier time though, in some
sense, the question could have been the basis for an appeal. Yet other language
in the opinion stresses an exception to the "basic rule" (coram nobis not to be
used to raise errors appearing on the face of the record), in terms of "due
process": ". . . [T]he scope of coram nobis will not be expanded unless the
injury done to the defendant would deprive him of due process of law."07 Both
factors were emphasized in the third case of July 3, 1957, People v. Shapiro,68
which held that petitioner could not attack his conviction on the ground that
certain testimony had been read to the jury in his absence in violation of
section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The upshot of the New York cases has been to place limitations on the
use of coram nobis. Coram nobis is generally confined to the raising of questions
which appear outside the trial record and hence could not have been raised on
appeal. The New York Court of Appeals has not fulfilled its duty under the
federal constitution to provide state prisoners with a state remedy to vindicate
all federal constitutional rights. Since 1941 the federal constitutional law has
changed-and some of the changes are retrospective according to federal law.
The result is that prisoners in New York are still held under the authority of
sentences resulting from procedures which are unconstitutional according to
federal principles which, under federal law, are to be applied retrospectively.
For some illegally held prisoners, no state remedy is available.
It is sound policy that litigation-even criminal litigation-should come
to an end. It might be sound policy that this value in determination of con-
troversy should override the value of equality before the law, and of seeing to
it that fair procedures (as fairness is currently understood) lie behind every
imprisonment; but the Supreme Court of the United States has resolved the
issue. In Fay v. Noia69 the High Court held that a possible opportunity to liti-
65. 3 N.Y.2d 200, 144 N.E.2d 10, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1957).
66. Id. at 203, 144 N.E.2d at 11, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
67. Id. at 202-03, 144 N.E.2d at 11, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
68. 3 N.Y.2d 200, 203, 144 N.E.2d 10, 12, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11, 14 (1957).
69. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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gate a constitutional question at the trial does not in every case foreclose
further constitutional inquiry. The Court did decide that Noia's confession was
unlawfully obtained and that he should either be released or be tried again
without the confession even though the New York system of remedies provided
no local means whereby such a defendant could obtain a review of his conviction.
Perhaps People v. Huntley gives an opening to expand the coram nobis
procedure. The judges of the Court of Appeals should give reality to an over-
stated formulation written by dissenting Judge Burke, in People v. DeFlumer.
"Coram nobis is the appropriate remedy where a defendant has been denied
due process of law."70
IV. IAPP v. OHIO
In Mapp v. Ohio71 the Supreme Court of the United States held that states
were required to exclude illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials. Some
years before in Wolf v. Colorado72 the High Court had embraced-the principle
that the standards of the fourth amendment were applicable in state criminal
proceedings, but the Court did not, as a corollary of that decision, extend the
federal exclusionary principle to state tribunals. However, in the dozen years
between Wolf v. Colorado, most states, including New York, had failed to pro-
vide an adequate remedy for the vindication of the constitutionally based right
to privacy. In Mapp the opinion of the Court said . . . "[T] he admission of
the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its
most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure."7 3
Indeed it is fair to say that a majority of the judges were of the view that
the states had failed to protect fourth amendment rights and that the Court
could "no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise." 74
In the wake of Mapp, the Court of Appeals was flooded with a rush of
questions never before put to the Court for decision. The first of the issues
posed by Mapp v. Ohio was whether the case was to be applied retrospectively.
People v. Lorig7 5 was pending on appeal at the time of Mapp, but the de-
fendant had not appealed on the ground that illegally obtained evidence had
been used against him. At the trial Loria's lawyer had, however, objected
to the receipt of the evidence. The Court of Appeals applied the general rule
which gives effect to the law as it exists at the time of a Court's decision in
spite of the fact that some members of the Court felt that they were not required
to do so because the majority opinion in the Mapp case had explained that
deterrence of unlawful police conduct was the chief objective of the exclusionary
70. 16 N.Y.2d 20, 23, 209 N.E.2d 93, 95, 261 N.Y.S.2d 42, 45 (1965) (dissenting
opinion).
71. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
72. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
73. 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
74. Id. at 660.
75. 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
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principle. Obviously the goal of deterrence can be achieved by prospective
operation of the Mapp rule. In fact, the Court of Appeals has applied the case
prospectively only, except in a limited group of cases pending on appeal at the
time of Mapp.
The facts in the Loria case provide an example of the underlying reasons
for the Supreme Court's opinion in Mapp. The opinion in Loria records that
the police had searched the defendant's apartment without a warrant and had
exercised police authority over him without any demonstrated public cause for
arrest. Without the exclusionary rule, or any other truly effective remedy to
vindicate violations of search and seizures protections the police had chosen
to ignore the existence of the constitutional principle.
After Loria the Court of Appeals was faced with a series of cases raising
the issue whether to apply Mapp retroactively if defense counsel had made no
express objection at the trial to admission of evidence taken as a result of
a search. In People v. FriolaT6 the defendant had been convicted a few days
before Mapp and his conviction affirmed several months thereafter by a lower
appellate court. The Court of Appeals agreed. Friola's lawyer had made no ob-
jection or inquiry about the lawfulness of the method of taking the evidence. On
the same day that Friola was decided, the Court of Appeals applied Mapp to a
case77 which was tried before Mapp but was pending on an intermediate appeal
after Mapp was decided. Defendant's counsel in this case made no express ob-
jection to the admission of evidence on constitutional grounds, but in People v.
O'Neill, the attorney did ask, for example, a police witness questions about
whether he had possessed a search warrant or a warrant of arrest and inquired of
a police lieutenant "under what law" he justified his presence in the house. The
majority of the court held "there was then no decisional law which authorized
him to go further, and, therefore, he [the defense lawyer] did enough to pre-
serve the issue for our review .... ,,78
By drawing the distinction between Friola and O'Neill the Court of Appeals
put a great premium on the lawyer who pays no attention to the existing law.
Judge Desmond's dissenting opinion is so persuasive that it is worth quoting at
some length.
In People v. Loria (10 N.Y.2d 368, 370 [Nov. 30, 1961]), adhering
to the "general rule that we give effect to the law as it exists at the
time of our decision" and citing Knapp v. Fasbender (1 N.Y.2d 212,
243) and other authorities, we held that we were bound to apply
Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 643) to pending appeals in this court. We
are repeating that same statement of law in People v. Muller (11
N.Y.2d 154), handed down today. Yet in the present case we are creat-
ing an unfair, illogical and inconsistent limitation of the "general rule."
76. 11 N.Y.2d 157, 182 N.E.2d 100, 227 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1962).
77. People v. O'Neill, 11 N.Y.2d 148, 182 N.E.2d 95, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962) ; see also
People v. Coffey, 11 N.Y.2d 142, 182 N.E.2d 92, 227 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1962).
78. People v. O'Neill, 11 N.Y.2d 148, 152, 182 N.E.2d 95, 97, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419
(1962).
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We are now saying that we will not apply the new law in a pre-Mapp
case unless on the trial the defendant's counsel did what was then
futile, unreasonable and contrary to the then law, that is, object to
the admission of testimony which under the unquestioned New York
law and Federal law (People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, cert. den. 270
U.S. 657; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25) was clearly admissible. So
the client whose counsel took a groundless objection gets the benefit
of the later (Mapp) change in law while the client whose lawyer re-
frained from mouthing a meaningless objection is prejudiced because
his lawyer took the correct position.79
After Mapp the legislature enacted a statute providing for the suppression
of illegally obtained evidence.80 The law expressly deals with the pre-trial
suppression of "property, papers, or things" and does not in terms refer to
the narrative of a witness who tells of things learned by an unlawful search.
The Court of Appeals in People v. Lavern l has decided that in such a case
a pre-trial motion under the statute is not necessary. The normal way to pre-
vent the telling of a narrative is to refuse the testimony of the witness when
it is offered, not to "suppress" it in advance.
In the same case the Court of Appeals extended protection against illegal
searches and seizures to entries authorized by a zoning ordinance which permits
the building inspector to "enter any building or premises at any reasonable hour"
in discharge of his duty. A majority of the Court of Appeals expressed the view
that such an entry over the objection of the occupant would be constitutionally
valid only for the purpose of civil proceedings but not to enforce the criminal
law. This is a curious point. It amounts to saying that persons who are suspected
of crime are entitled to greater protection against unconstitutional searches
and seizures than honest citizens subject only to civil proceedings.
The dissenting justices argued that the majority opinion had undercut the
most effective tool of enforcing health and safety building regulations, i.e.,
periodic inspection. The three dissenters objected to the distinction drawn by
the majority of the Court. The inspector's right to search is made to depend
upon the consequences, civil or criminal, which might be appropriate, given
what the inspection reveals. The dissenters objected to laying down a rule
regulating official conduct by making reference to events not yet existing.
The decision in Mapp v. Ohio inevitably raised the question whether state
courts might continue to employ evidence resulting from wiretapping. Wire-
tapping and other forms of electronic eavesdropping are not, at the moment,
prohibited by the fourth amendment. As the law presently stands, unless a
trespass is involved there is no constitutional or statutory prohibition against
electronic eavesdropping except for the prohibition of the Federal Commu-
79. People v. Friola, 11 N.Y.2d 157, 161, 182 N.E.2d 100, 102, 227 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425
(1962).
80. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 815-d.
81. 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 NE.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964).
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nications Act which prohibits any person to "intercept and divulge" telephone
messages and wireless communications. 82
In 1952 the Supreme Court had decided in Schwartz v. Texas83 that though
evidence obtained by wiretapping was inadmissible in courts of the United
States, such evidence could be introduced into a state court proceedings. The
Court refused to presume that a federal statute operated to override a state's
judgment that evidence may be received even though it had come from an un-
lawful source. Was Schwartz still authoritative after the Mapp decision? It
was a point of argument for the majority in Schwartz v. Texas that wiretap
evidence, prohibited only by federal statute, was admissible because evidence
taken in an unlawful searches and seizures repugnant to the Fourth Amendment
would nonetheless be admissible in a state court. The majority cited Wol] v.
Colorado. Arguably Schwartz was a product of the days in which federal law
operated to exclude only coerced confessions from state criminal cases. Perhaps
the older case had been drained of its vitality by the Court's new approach in
Mapp. Such an argument was possible, but hardly persuasive, since Schwartz
had been reaffirmed in 1961,84 several months prior to the Mapp decision.
Thus a majority of the New York Court of Appeals could assert, "We
thus have a clear and authoritative decision by the Supreme Court, on the eve
of Mapp v. Ohio, reaffirming the Schwartz doctrine that state-obtained wire
taps may be admitted into evidence in criminal trials in state courts not-
withstanding section 605 of the Federal Communications Act."85 Judge Fuld,
with whom Chief Justice Desmond and Judge Burke concurred, dissented
on the ground that the exclusion of wire tap evidence was necessary to avoid
an ugly spectacle: the commission of a criminal act in the courtroom. It will
be remembered, the provision of the Federal Communications Act carries
criminal sanctions. The crime, to "intercept and divulge," would take place
in the courtroom. It is important to note that the dissenters did not ground
their position on the compulsion of federal precedent, but rather were moved
by points of policy which, in their view, should rule criminal proceedings in
New York.
Before Mapp v. Ohio, New York had many unanswered questions respect-
ing the law of arrest and search. Without the exclusionary evidence rule, few
issues of this sort are put to appellate courts. Deciding one of the many un-
answered points, the New York Court of Appeals has sanctioned "on-the-street"
interrogation with its accompanying search, over the vigorous dissent of Judge
Fuld. People v. Rivera6 involved an incident of police work in a relatively
dangerous neighborhood. Policemen in a patrol car observed two men walking
in front of a bar and grill, and looking in the window from time to time. A
82. Federal Communications Act § 605, 47 U.S.C.A. § 605.
83. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
84. Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961).
85. People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 355, 183 N.E.2d 689, 691, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409
(1962).
86. 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
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policeman, fearful of a theft offense which might be aggravated by the use of
force, approached one of the men from the police car. The suspect began to
walk away rapidly, whereupon the detective ordered him to stop. The officer
then "patted the outside of his clothing" and found a hard object that proved
to be a fully loaded .22 caliber pistol. Later the suspect, charged with carrying
the weapon, made a motion to suppress the evidence. Judge Bergan asserted
that the authority of the police to stop and question is "perfectly clear." Prompt
inquiry into suspicious or unusual circumstances is necessary if the police are
to prevent crime. The evidence needed to make such an inquiry was declared
to be "less incriminating than the ground for an arrest for a crime known to
have been committed. '8 7 The lawfulness of a police "frisk" is established by
recognizing the authority of the officer to stop and inquire. The hazards of
such an inquiry are great. "We ought not, in deciding what is reasonable, close
our eyes to the actualities of street dangers in performing this kind of public
duty."88
According to the majority of the Court of Appeals, their decision raised
no serious federal constitutional problem. The constitutional restriction is against
"unreasonable searches, not against all searches . . . and what is reasonable
always involves a balancing of interest . ,,s9
Judge Fuld dissented. He agreed that the police may put questions to
anyone on the street, but the issue, as he saw it, was whether the Constitution
permitted "the sort of search of a person which the People term a 'frisk.' "190
A "frisk," said Judge Fuld, is indeed a search to be measured by the funda-
mental law. The Constitution condemns "the slightest touching." "Free men
should no more be subject to having the police run their hands over the pockets
than through them." 91 The Judge also expressed concern over the possibility
of abuse in that such searches would not be confined to "frisks."
Judge Fuld's concern was well founded. People v. Rivera has been extended
to uphold a search which went beyond merely passing the hands over the body
to determine whether a suspect is carrying a weapon. In People v. Pugachk9
the majority of the Court approved the search of a briefcase in a police car in
which a suspect was riding, even though the briefcase was not in the possession
of the suspect when it was opened. Once more Judge Fuld dissented.
In the Court of Appeals' most recent searches and seizures opinion, the
Court decided that a defendant may attack the validity of a search warrant in
a pre-trial motion to suppress by challenging the truthfulness of the factual state-
ments in the affidavit on which the search warrant was issued. The People had
argued that the "probable cause" for the issuance of the warrant is to be judged
87. Id. at 445, 201 N.E.2d at 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
88. Id. at 446, 201 N.E.2d at 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
89. Id. at 447, 201 N.E.2d at 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
90. Id. at 448, 201 NE.2d at 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
91. Id. at 450, 201 N.E.2d at 37, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
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solely from the statement of facts in the affidavit. In People v. Alfinito98
the affidavit recited information from a "reliable" informant and from the
personal observation of the attesting policeman respecting suspicious activities
near the defendant's apartment. At the hearing on the motion to suppress the
police officer attested not only to the informant's information, but to his own
observations. The defendant's wife and another person, however, gave informa-
tion that the defendant was not at the apartment at the times referred to in
the police officer's testimony. Chief Judge Desmond's opinion, permitting the
dispute of facts, is based on his view that "modern thought which produced
the decision in Mapp v. Ohio . . . would make incongruous any holding that a
search warrant is beyond attack even on proof that the allegations on which
it was based were perjured." 94
The decision must be limited to a situation in which the police-witness
may have given perjured testimony. If such were not the case, the result would be
most unfortunate. The police can be taught to rely upon sources of information
which deserve credibility but they cannot be taught to rely only upon informa-
tion which is, in fact, truthful. A decision opening up the ultimate truth of the
statements made in the affidavit would not prevent other searches based on
false information because, in the nature of things, the police must act and they
will act on a belief that the information upon which they act is truthful.
V. CONCLUSION
The work of the Court of Appeals in 1965 in the area of criminal pro-
cedure is sharply different from its work in 1941. How have the judges responded
to the pressure for change generated during twenty-five years? The Court's
work has been spotty. It has responded generously to the claims of a right to
counsel. Here, indeed, the Court of Appeals has given leadership to the Supreme
Court of the United States in some ways. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals has not been sensitive to claims respecting coerced confessions or to
the claims of the victims of illegal searches and seizures. Most unfortunately,
the Court has failed to build an adequate post-conviction remedy to vindicate
all claims under the Constitution. Those who wish to de-emphasize the role of
the federal courts in state criminal cases will succeed only when state courts
show themselves adequate to the task of supplying remedies. Our Court of
Appeals would display wisdom by exploiting the new opening made possible
by the application of coram nobis in People v. Huntley. In its service to the
principle that legal proceedings, at some point, must end, the Court of Appeals
has futilely resisted the winds of change. Life that survives the hurricane bends
to it.
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